In 2002, the EAC Heads of State Summit decided that the EAC should negotiate regional and multilateral issues as a whole. The draft framework for joint participation and implementation of regional and multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) has been finalized. The objective of this framework is to guide EAC partner states in the implementation of various multilateral environmental agreements to which partner states are parties. The main instruments available to countries under international law to cooperate on a wide range of global environmental challenges are international conventions and treaties on the environment and natural resources, also known as multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs). MEAS are state-to-state agreements that can take the form of a “soft law”, which establish non-binding principles that parties must take into consideration when taking action to address a particular environmental problem, or “hard-law”, which set legally binding measures to achieve an environmental objective. Recently, there is an economic literature that asserts that international environmental agreements (IAAs) cannot have any real effect due to their voluntary and self-imposed nature. This literature concludes that the concepts of EIAs are the codification of non-cooperative balance, and recent empirical work has supported this conclusion in the context of the Montreal Protocol. This paper concludes the opposite by comparing CFC emissions, which are implicit in cooperative and non-cooperative management circuits. The cooperative route is implicit in the terms of the Montreal Protocol. The non-cooperative route is implicit in the behaviour of countries during the period of unilateral management of CFC emissions. This study assesses the link between countries` propensity to produce CFCs and per capita income during the period 1976-1988 (before the entry into force of the Montreal Protocol). It then extrapolates this unilateral management route beyond 1988 and compares it to the commitments made under the Cooperative System. This comparison of the projected non-operational trajectory with the commitments of the Montreal Protocol allows a qualitative examination of theories on the economic basis of self-imposed SEA.
We find that without the protocol, CFC production (and therefore emissions) would have tripled over the next fifty years. This study also complements Kuznets` existing environmental curve analyses by providing estimates of the unilateral management of a global externality. In this way, we will be able to evaluate the distribution effects of the protocol in addition to its effectiveness. Using dynamic estimation methods in a panel of about thirty countries over 13 years old, the inflection point of the relationship between CFC production and income is (1986) $16,000. This means that developing countries bear the greatest costs of implementing the Montreal Protocol. Among the global environmental problems that MEAS are intended to address are: biodiversity loss, negative effects of climate change, ozone depletion, hazardous waste, organic pollutants, marine pollution, trade in endangered species, destruction of wetlands, etc. In cooperation with COMESA, SADC and the African Union Commission in the framework of the African Environment Conference, the EAC has worked to consolidate a unified African position on climate change, which will serve as the basis for the African negotiating group under the UNFCCC. As a result, the capacity of African negotiators to articulate the African position within the UNFCCC has been strengthened. There are national contact points for biosafety, which can be found at the Science and Technology Council, the Office of the Vice-President and the Ministry of Water and Environment in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. . . .